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COMMENT
PEOPLE v. ANTOMMARCHI: DO
ANTOMMARCHI RIGHTS BENEFIT
ANYONE? A COMPREHENSIVE
EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION AND ITS
RAMIFICATIONS
One of the most basic rights of a criminal defendant is the
right to be present at trial.' This right is sternly embedded in
1 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 98-99 (1934); Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1892) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1884));
Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448 (1892); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d
489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Decision, Presence of Accused Felon at His Trial, 10
N.Y.L.F. 262, 262 (1964) (stating that presence of accused felon at trial is well estab-
lished principle of law).
A criminal defendant's right to be present, however, is not absolute. See Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450-56 (1912) (indicating defendant can waive right
when voluntarily absent from court). By the turn of the century, common law pro-
vided that a criminal defendant could waive his right to be present by voluntarily
absenting himself once the trial began, as long as he was not charged with a capital
offense and was not in custody. See James G. Starkey, Trial In Absentia, 53 ST.
JomN's L. Ray. 721, 724 (1979). In 1912, the Supreme Court in Diaz recognized the
right as extending to every stage of the proceedings and being almost as important as
presence at the trial itself. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455. The Second Circuit, however, was
reluctant to extend this rule to a criminal defendant who absents himself before the
trial begins. See Starkey, supra, at 727-28. In United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202,
1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), the Second Circuit held that com-
mencing a trial without the defendant is within the court's discretion but should only
be exercised in extenuating circumstances in which the interest of the absent defend-
ant is clearly outweighed by that of the public. Id. In reaching this decision, the trial
court must consider scheduling problems, the burden of multiple trials, and the abil-
ity to proceed promptly without the defendant. Id. Although Tortora's narrow limits
were considered stricter than what the Constitution requires, the Supreme Court im-
plicitly upheld the constitutionality of commencing trial without a defendant in Tacon
v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 352 (1973).
Alternatively, a defendant may waive his right to be present by engaging in se-
vere misconduct. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (defendant can lose
right to be present if disruptive behavior creates difficulty in continuing trial); Sny-
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common law2 and guaranteed by both the federal3 and state con-
stitutions.4 Additionally, it has been secured by federal5 and state
der, 291 U.S. at 106; Scurr v. Moore, 647 F.2d 854, 858 (8th Cir.) (finding conduct that
"violated the dignity, order and decorum of court proceedings" justified defendant's
removal), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981). This common-law waiver has since been
codified in both state and federal statutes. See FED. R. CiM. P. 43(b)(2); N.Y. CRIM.
Paoc. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993).
A defendant can also waive his right to be present by simply requesting that it be
waived. See Pollizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1317 (2d Cir. 1991). The
Supreme Court has pronounced that "[no procedural principle is more familiar to this
Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil
cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having
jurisdiction to determine it." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (cita-
tions omitted). In order to waive a fundamental right, such as the right to be present,
however, the waiver must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
2 See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 99. The right of a criminal defendant to be present at
his trial dates back to early Anglo-Saxon law. Starkey, supra note 1, at 721-22. This
right stems from the early methods of determining guilt, such as trial by ordeal and
trial by battle, which necessitated the defendant's presence. Id.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ... . " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause has often been
cited as providing the right of presence. See, e.g., Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106; Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1911); United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 846
(D.C. Cir. 1982); infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Confrontation
Clause roots of right of presence). It likewise follows that a fair hearing, in accordance
with due process protections, cannot be held without the defendant's presence. Calley
v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 683 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.
1975); SEC v. Kimmes, 759 F. Supp. 430, 437 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused.., shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.... No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").
5 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). Rule 43(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he
defendant shall be present... at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
thejury .... Id. The Rule codifies the common law and the constitutional guarantees
of the Confrontation Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
Washington, 705 F.2d at 496; United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, passim (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974). As originally promulgated, Rule 43 was in-
tended to be a restatement of existing law on the issue of a criminal defendant's right
to be present at his trial. See 8B JAmEs W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T
43.01[2] (2d ed. 1993).
Rule 43 grants broader rights than does the Constitution. See United States v.
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985) (indicating that in some circumstances defendant's
right to be present may be guaranteed by rule 43 but not by Constitution). The rule
must, however, be read in conjunction with rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which requires prejudicial error for a reversal. See United States v. Schor,
418 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that granting of new trial due to defendant's
absence subject to rule 52); Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 619 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965) (distinguishing harmless and plain error).
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statutes.6 Traditionally, a defendant's right to be present at trial
has extended to the impaneling of the jury.7 Despite this historic
protection afforded the accused, sidebar conferences8 conducted
without the defendant's presence during impaneling have become
commonplace in today's courts. 9 Recently, however, in People v.
6 See, e.g., N.Y. CRni. PRoC. LAv § 260.20 (McKinney's 1993). Section 260.20 pro-
vides that "[a] defendant must be personally present during the trial of an indictment
."Id.
7 See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
Jury impaneling means the entire process of jury selection-the final placing of
twelve jurors as a "panel." See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
Therefore, the impaneling of the jury has been held to be the official starting point of
a trial. United States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir.) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 578 (1884)), cert. denied sub nom. Gregory v. United States, 409 U.S. 956
(1972). A defendant's right to be present at jury impaneling includes all steps of se-
lecting the jury, including the peremptory striking of members of the venire. United
States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974). The
purpose of the rule is so that the defendant can advise his counsel as to his defense.
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106 ("[D]efense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to
be present at the examination ofjurors... for it will be in his power, if present, to give
advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial
himself."). But cf Washington, 705 F.2d at 497 (noting that right to be present at voir
dire not as strong as at other stages of trial).
New York's ruling granting a criminal defendant the right to be present at jury
selection "is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of [New York] state." Paul Lewis, In-
terpretation of Law in Letter is Disputed, 208 N.Y. L.J. 112 (1992) (letter to editor).
The rule has a 122-year history in New York case law and is also codified in section
260.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. See id.; see also infra note 20 (dis-
cussing § 260.30).
8 See David Bauder, Ruling Endangers Thousands of Convictions, TMs UNION,
Nov. 14, 1992, at B2. Sidebar conferences are often called by a trial judge to allow
questioning of potential jurors on sensitive matters that they are uncomfortable re-
vealing in open court. Id.; see Court Chaos? Wait and See New 'Sidebar Rule is An
Affirmation of Rights, BuFF. NEWS, Nov. 22, 1992, at G8 [hereinafter Court Chaos?]
("Such meetings-known in the trade as 'sidebars'-are common. They allow discus-
sion of a potential jurors' [sic] viewpoints, prejudices and life history that might have
a bearing on selection but might also be embarrassing to the potential juror.").
Sidebar conferences were established on the suggestion of criminal defendants to pro-
mote impartial juries. See Washington, 705 F.2d at 496. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit first suggested sidebars in United States v. Ridley, 412 F.2d 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1969), in response to the defendant's claim that discussing sensitive issues in open
court affected the impartiality of the other jurors.
9 See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d 1381 (N.Y. 1992) (allowing inquiry with
prospective jurors about effect of defendant's illness on impartiality in absence of de-
fendant). This was "customary and established procedure." Id. at 1383; see People v.
Howard, 562 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div.) (disallowing appeal because right of presence
waived by inaction), appeal denied, 573 N.E.2d 583, 583 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Blake,
551 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div.) (requiring right of presence to be preserved), appeal
denied, 555 N.E.2d 621, 621 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Ganett, 416 N.Y.S.2d 914 (App.
Div. 1979) (holding that bench inquiries without defendant not prejudicial), affd, 417
N.E.2d 88 (N.Y. 1980). The majority rule is to allow defendants to listen in at the
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Antommarchi,'0 the New York Court of Appeals radically de-
parted from the judicial norm by holding that a criminal defend-
ant has a fundamental right' to be present at sidebar conferences
bench only when they request to do so, but to deem the right waived upon lack of such
request. See Washington, 705 F.2d at 497. In the great majority of cases, defendants
waive their right to approach the sidebar. See id.
Sidebar conferences were particularly common in the New York City area. See
Ruling Threatens Verdicts: Defendants Get Listening Rights, ATLANTA CONST., Nov.
14, 1992, at B10; Court Chaos?, supra note 8, at G8. The practice was so long-standing
and pervasive that neither defendants nor their attorneys ever imagined that such a
right of presence existed. See Morning Edition: New York State Supreme Court Hears
Case on Retrying Convicted Criminals (National Public Radio, Nov. 19, 1992). Paul
Schectman, counsel for the Manhattan District Attorney, stated, "Whether you call it
a technicality or a fundamental right, the important thing is nobody knew it existed."
Id.
Under Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, the New York Court of Appeals expanded the
rights enjoyed by an accused, even while the United States Supreme Court was mov-
ing in the opposite direction. See Jane Fritsch, Ruling in Minor Trial Imperils Some
Big New York Verdicts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1992, at Al, B5 [hereinafter Fritsch,
Ruling in Minor Trial]; Jane Fritsch, Court Limits Appeals of Juror-Interview Errors,
N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at B1, B14 [hereinafter Fritsch, Court Limits Appeals]. In
April 1992, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant has the right to appeal if his
request to join the sidebar during jury questioning, when his presence would have
had a substantial effect, was denied. People v. Sloan, 592 N.E.2d 784, 786-87 (N.Y.
1992).
10 604 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1992).
11 Id. at 97. Acting Chief Judge Simons' use of the term "fundamental" in describ-
ing the defendant's right was ambiguous because of its many different definitions, one
of which denotes a constitutional right. See WEses LEGAL THESAURus/DicTIONARY 342
(1985). Fundamental rights are derived from, and guaranteed by, the Constitution,
see, e.g., Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032
(1984), and state constitutions, see, e.g., Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind.
1976); see also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990). However, in Mitchell, a
later opinion that determined that Antommarchi would not have retroactive effect,
Simons wrote that it was strictly a statutory decision, with no constitutional implica-
tions. People v. Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1385 (N.Y. 1992). Yet, ironically, the
Antommarchi opinion makes no mention of § 260.20, except to cite it in one paren-
thetical. Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 96. Some commentators have interpreted the
decision to be statutory. See Sidney H. Stein, New York Court of Appeals Roundup,
209 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1993); Fritsch, Court Limits Appeals, supra note 9, at B1; Gary Spen-
cer, No Retroactive Effect for Antommarchi" Defendants' Right to Hear Jurors Ques-
tioned, 208 N.Y. L.J 118 (1992) [hereinafter Spencer, No Retroactive Effect]; Gary
Spencer, Misreading of Controversial Ruling Claimed by Simons, 208 N.Y.L.J. 100
(1992) [hereinafter Spencer, Misreading]; John Caher, Court Cuts Way to Appeal,
TIMES UNION, Dec. 18, 1992, at B2. Others have construed it as resting on both statu-
tory and federal constitutional grounds. See Fritsch, Ruling in Minor Trial, supra
note 9, at Al. Chief Judge Simons later tried to narrow the scope by stating that the
holding applies only to an "extreme case" in which questioning prospective jurors
about potential bias takes place without the defendant and at the invitation of the
trial judge. See Spencer, Misreading, supra, at 1; see also Fritsch, Ruling In Minor
Trial, supra note 9, at Al ("I think when the court thinks about it, it's going to think
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during jury selection when the questioning relates to the objectiv-
ity of prospective jurors. 2
In Antommarchi, the defendant was convicted of third degree
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the Supreme
Court of New York County.'3 During the voir dire, the trial judge
questioned several of the prospective jurors at the bench regard-
ing personal matters they did not wish to reveal in open court.14
These sidebar conferences were recorded in the presence of de-
fendant's counsel,' 5 while the defendant remained only a few feet
away.16 The defendant did not request to be present at these con-
ferences, nor did he object to his absence at any point during the
trial.' 7 Nevertheless, he appealed his conviction to the New York
Court of Appeals, claiming, inter alia, that his absence from the
sidebar conferences deprived him of his right to be present at
every material stage of trial.'" The New York Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that sidebars constitute material stages of trial,
and accordingly, reversed his conviction and granted him a new
trial.19
Writing for a unanimous court, Acting Chief Judge Simons
explained that under New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPLf)
twice. They may want to step back and take a couple of paces and rethink this." (quot-
ing Vivian Berger, vice dean of Columbia University Law School)).
12 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
13 People v. Antommarchi, 573 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1991) rev'd, 604 N.E.2d 95
(N.Y. 1992). The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the defendant's con-
viction. Id.
14 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97. Of 67 potential jurors, 37 were individually
questioned at the bench. See Spencer, No Retroactive Effect, supra note 11, at 1. The
potential jurors spoke about a wide variety of issues which concerned them. See
Steven W. Fisher, "People v. Antommarchi: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 208 N.Y.L.J.
1 (1992). For example, several discussed their "business commitments, doctor ap-
pointments, and Sabbath observance." Id. Others expressed their attitudes about
drugs and revealed prior arrests of family members. Id. Additionally, the potential
jurors were asked whether they or anyone they had known had been the victim of a
crime or had been accused of committing a crime. Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
They were also asked whether they thought the defendant was guilty simply because
he had been arrested. Id.
15 See Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
16 See Bauder, supra note 8, at B2.
17 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1.
18 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 96. On appeal, the defendant argued that both his
constitutional and statutory rights were violated by his absence from the sidebar con-
ferences. Id. (claiming breach of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, rights
under Article 1, section 6 of New York State Constitution and section 260.20 of New
York Criminal Procedure Law).
19 Id. at 97.
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:991
section 260.20,20 as well as New York case law,2 ' a defendant has
a fundamental right to be present during any material stage of his
trial.22 More importantly, the court concluded that sidebar confer-
ences constitute material stages of trial.23 The court, however,
limited a defendant's right to be present at sidebar conferences to
questioning relating to a potential juror's bias;24 thus, a defendant
need not be present for questioning relating to routine matters
such as prior obligations or physical impairments.25 The court
reasoned that a defendant should be entitled to observe prospec-
tive jurors' facial expressions, demeanor, and body language, so as
to gauge any possible bias.26 Furthermore, the court concluded
that since the right to be present at sidebars is fundamental, it
cannot be waived by a defendant's inaction,27 thus attaching
automatically.
20 N.Y. CrM. PROC. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993). Section 260.30 recognizes
jury selection as part of a jury trial. Id.; see Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892) (impaneling jury members represents official start of trial). Section 260.20 in-
corporates the impaneling of the jury as a stage at which a defendant has the right to
be present. See People v. Sloan, 592 N.E.2d 784, 786 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Velasco,
570 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 (N.Y. 1991); People v. Mullen, 374 N.E.2d 369, 372 (N.Y.
1978).
21 See Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 786; People v. Turaine, 577 N.E.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. 1991);
Velasco, 570 N.E.2d at 1071; People v. Mehmedi, 505 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1987); Mullen,
374 N.E.2d at 370.
22 See Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97; Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 786; see also supra
note 11 (discussing ambiguity of word "fundamental").
23 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97; see Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 787 (concluding that
failure to permit defendant's presence at sidebar questioning of potential jurors was
error).
24 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97 (citing Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 787). The defend-
ant should be present to permit the enhanced assessment of prospective jurors for
conferring and advising counsel. Id.
25 Id.; Velasco, 570 N.E.2d at 1071.
26 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97. The court felt this was necessary so that a
defendant can "have the opportunity to assess the juror's 'facial expressions, de-
meanor and other subliminal responses.'" Id. (quoting Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 787).
27 d.; see People v. Dokes, 595 N.E.2d 836, 840 (N.Y. 1992) (explaining failure to
object to fundamental rights does not bar appeal). The Antommarchi court did not
hold that the right cannot be waived, but rather that it will not be waived by the
defendant's inaction. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 2. Although the Antommarchi opin-
ion did not discuss how a defendant can waive his right, New York courts have held
that fundamental rights will be preserved unless they are "knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily" waived by the defendant personally. People v. Epps, 334 N.E.2d 566,
571 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975). Almost immediately following the
Antommarchi decision, Supreme Court Judge Gerald Sheindlin devised a procedure
to allow mid-trial waivers to avoid a flood of potential reversals regarding matters
which were already pending. People v. Cook, 591 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (Sup. Ct. 1992). In
order to determine whether a defendant had "knowingly, intelligently, and volunta-
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It is submitted that by granting criminal defendants an auto-
matic right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective
jurors, the Antommarchi court erred to the detriment of both the
criminal justice system and criminal defendants. This Comment
asserts that such conferences do not constitute material stages of
trial, and therefore, do not trigger a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to be present. Further, it is suggested that "Antom-
marchi rights" are not supported by section 260.20 of the CPL.
rily" waived his right, Judge Sheindlin devised the following twelve questions for any-
one seeking a waiver in order to ensure that the defendant was made aware of and
voluntarily relinquished the right to be present at the sidebar:
(1) Do you know that you... have a right to be present when a prospective
juror is questioned concerning the juror's qualifications?
(2) You... have a right to hear the answers of the prospective juror.
(3) You... have a right to evaluate the answers.., to determine for yourself
the prospective juror's bias, hostility or predisposition... so that you may
see the juror's facial expressions, demeanor and other subliminal responses.
(4) You... have a right to determine... whether the juror can be fair and
impartial in this trial.
(5) Do you understand your rights?
(6) Do you wish to ask me any questions about your rights?
(7) Do you waive your right to be present during the questioning of any pro-
spective juror?
(8) Did anyone force you to waive your right to be present?
(9) Did anyone threaten or coerce you to waive your right?
(10) Are you waiving your rights voluntarily?
(11) Are you waiving your rights freely?
(12) If I asked you these same questions at the time of jury selection, would
your answers be the same as it [sic] is now?
Id.
Initially, several commentators reacted to the Antommarchi decision with a surge
of opposition and outrage. See supra note 11. Although these tensions eased slightly
when the New York Court of Appeals decided that Antommarchi would be applied
only prospectively, see People v. Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 (N.Y. 1992), a debate
nevertheless persists concerning the legitimacy and ramifications of the ruling itself.
Some critics argue that because the benefit of a defendant's presence at such sidebars
would be negligible, if not non-existent, Antommarchi rights are unnecessary. See,
e.g., George F. Will, Our Expanding Menu of Rights, NEWSWEEK-, Dec. 14, 1992, at 90
(discussing absurd results that may arise due to Antommarchi); infra notes 70 to 81
and accompanying text (setting forth policy arguments against Antommarchi). How-
ever, other commentators reason that the mere prospect of imprisonment warrants
providing defendants with the right to attend the sidebar. See Bauder, supra note 8,
at B2 ("This goes right to the heart of the fundamental right to be present at your
own trial ... These are people who are going to be judging this defendant." (quoting
Kenneth Finkelman, Legal Aid Society attorney)); Lewis, supra note 7, at 2 (stating
defendants should have right to be present at sidebar and should have choice to waive
right); Spencer, Misreading, supra note 11, at 1 (explaining defendants should be
present because "[a] general bias [on the part of a prospective juror] can be much,
much more stubborn than a specific bias" (quoting William A. Loeb, Legal Aid Society
attorney)).
19931
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Finally, this Comment concludes that on both policy and practical-
ity grounds Antommarchi rights must be eradicated.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
Courts have determined that a criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to be present at trial generally commences with jury
selection, 28 and extends through the return of a verdict.29 A
number of constitutional provisions collectively establish this
right: the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,30 the
28 See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884) (stating that trial commences at
latest when jury impaneling begins); United States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st
Cir.) (stating that challenging prospective jurors is essential to defendants), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 956 (1972); see also supra note 7 (discussing inclusion ofjury impanel-
ing as material stage of trial).
In United Stated v. Chrisco, the circuit court struggled with the issue of what
constituted "presence." 493 F.2d 232, 235 (8th Cir. 1974). In that case, the defendants
were present in the courtroom during the entire voir dire of the jury for causal strikes.
Id. at 236. The peremptory strikes, however, were made in the absence of the defend-
ants, but in the presence of their counsel, although the defendants were later present
at the reading of the list by the clerk. Id. The court held that the defendants were
"sufficiently present" at the impaneling of the jury to satisfy the requirements of rule
43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. Id. at 237.
In addition to being present during jury impaneling, a criminal defendant also
has the right to be present when the jury instructions are given, even if they are only
supplemental. See Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1960) (not-
ing that defendant has right to "see and observe" proceedings). The majority view is
that the right to be present at jury impaneling exists only in felony cases. State ex rel.
Shetsky v. Utecht, 36 N.W.2d 126, 130-31 (Minn. 1949). But see State v. Campbell, 24
S.E. 875, 878 (W.Va. 1896) (recognizing right to be present at jury impaneling in mis-
demeanor trials if imprisonment is at stake).
29 See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975) (discussing defendant's
right to be present until jury renders verdict); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 316
(1915) (stating that defendant has right to be present at every stage of trial but may
waive right to be present at verdict); see also J.H.W., Presence of Accused Felon at His
Trial, 10 N.Y.L.F. 262, 263 (1964) ("[Ilt is a prisoner's right to be present throughout
the entire trial, from the commencement of jury selection until the verdict is rendered
and the jury discharged.").
Although a criminal defendant possesses a broad right to be present at trial, he
does not have the right to be present during preliminary, preparatory, or ministerial
stages of processes, or during proceedings which do not take place during trial. See,
e.g., Smaldone v. People, 81 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo. 1938) (holding that defendant does
not have right to be present when jurors are drawn to be sent to defendant's district);
North v. State, 65 So.2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1952) (holding that it is not necessary for defend-
ant to be present when judge excuses jurors), affd, 346 U.S. 932 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Green, 20 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Mass. 1939) (holding that defendant's right to be
present does not extend to matters before trial begins); State v. Moon 262, P. 859, 860-
61 (Or. 1925) (same).
30 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see New York v. Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 (N.Y.
1992) (stating that right to be present is rooted in Confrontation Clause of Sixth
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,3 1 and the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 32 The Due
Process Clause, however, has been regarded as perhaps the
strongest source for the right to be present. 3
A. The Due Process Standard for Presence
In Snyder v. Massachusetts,34 the Supreme Court set forth
the standard to be utilized in determining whether due process
mandates the presence of the accused. 5 Justice Cardozo stated
that "the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to
the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his
absence, and to that extent only."36 The Snyder Court further ar-
ticulated that the Constitution grants a defendant the right to be
present only when "his presence has a relation, reasonably sub-
stantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against
the charge;"3 7 it does not assure such a right "when presence
Amendment); United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same). Since
the Confrontation Clause ensures a criminal defendant the right to confront all wit-
nesses, it necessarily follows that a defendant cannot exercise this right without being
present at trial. See supra note 3 (discussing derivation of right of presence from Con-
frontation Clause).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Mitchell, 606 N.E.2d at 1384; Raper, 676 F.2d at
846; WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRnmINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2, at 1011 (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that due process components expand right of presence to situations
other than confronting witnesses).
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense."); see also United
States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting right of presence is
essential to constitutional right of assistance); cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819-21 (1975) (Sixth Amendment allows defendant to make own defense).
33 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) (discussing how Due Pro-
cess Clause ensures fair trial and creates right to be present).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 107-08; see People v. Sloan, 592 N.E.2d 784, 786 (N.Y. 1992). A defend-
ant's right to be present requires not only physical presence, but also the ability to
understand the proceedings and cooperate with his attorney. See In re Dennis, 335
P.2d 657, 661 (Cal. 1959).
37 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06; see Sloan, 592 N.E.2d at 786 (holding no right of
presence exists where defendants presence or absence could have no effect on ulti-
mate fairness); Peterson v. United States, 411 F.2d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 920 (1969) (holding that defendant's absence did not violate Snyder
standard).
The court also held that there is no fundamental right for a defendant to be pres-
ent at a juror view. See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 122. Yet in Snyder, Justice Cardozo wrote
that some "[plrivileges [are] so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a
fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men." Id. M4ost impor-
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would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow."38 Therefore, for a
stage of trial to be deemed one that requires a defendant's pres-
ence, it must be essential to the trial, such that the defendant's
absence might hinder the ability to properly defend.39
Factors which courts will consider include whether the de-
fendant's attorney was present,40 and whether he or she had am-
ple opportunity to consult with the defendant.41 Additionally,
with regard to jury selection, a court will evaluate other factors
such as the nature of the questioning,42 how far from the bench
tantly, he suggested that a court should consider the particular circumstances of each
case, in light of the entire record, to determine whether the defendant's absence "is so
flagrantly unjust that the Constitution of the United States steps in to forbid it." Id.
at 115.
38 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07; see People v. Velasco, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (N.Y.
1991) (holding that discussion in chambers was for purpose of preliminary advise-
ment and not material part of trial).
39 See People v. Harris, 559 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1990) (holding defendant's presence
during communication between judge and deliberating jury was not constitutionally
mandated because it would have had no substantial impact on defense). Although the
Supreme Court has pronounced that the right exists at "every stage of the trial," Illi-
nois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1973), it has also stated that the defendant "has no
constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror."
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26 (Stevens, J. concurring), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
910 (1983); see United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985). In Gagnon, the
Supreme Court held that the defendant's rule 43 right of presence was not violated by
in camera discussion with a sworn juror who was concerned about the defendant's
sketchings. Id. In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated that "the mere occurrence of
an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a depri-
vation of any constitutional right." Id. (quoting Rushen, 464 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
40 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (stressing importance of counsel's
presence).
41 See United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
847 (1974). In Chrisco, the court also considered whether the defendants were "suffi-
ciently present." Id. Although the defendants were not in the courtroom when a per-
emptory strike was made, they were considered "sufficiently present" because they
were in the courtroom when the list was read aloud. Id. at 236-37.
42 See United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Plumeri v. United States, 400 U.S. 825 (1970). In Dioguardi, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that an accused does not have a right to
be present during a sidebar juror questioning if adequately represented by counsel.
Id. The defendants were seated only 15 to 20 feet from the bench, and their attorney
was informed of the procedure of requesting that the defendants come nearer, but did
not request their presence. Id. "[M]ost of the jurors thus questioned were excused by
the court," and those who remained were challenged by either the prosecution or de-
fense. Id. at 1039-40. Similarly, in People v. Mullen, 374 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1978), the
New York Court of Appeals held that an in camera discussion with a juror about his
objectivity did not require a defendant's presence because "the presence of counsel...
was sufficient to afford the defendant a 'fair and just hearing.'" Id. at 371; see also
People v. Martinez, 318 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (Sup. Ct. 1971) ("[Nlo useful purpose would
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the defendant was situated,4" how much of the questioning was
conducted in defendant's absence,' and whether the particular
juror was actually removed from the case.45
B. Application to Antommarchi
In Antommarchi, each sidebar conference was conducted in
the presence of defendant's counsel,46 with whom the defendant
was given ample opportunity to consult.4 7 Furthermore, Antom-
marchi was only a few feet away the entire time.'" Although ap-
proximately half of the prospective jurors were questioned at the
bench,'9 most of them ultimately did not serve on the jury. 0
Twenty-one were excused on consent, one was removed for cause,
and four were struck by the defense.5 ' Thus, of the sixty-seven
prospective jurors originally impaneled, only eleven remained who
had been questioned in Antommarchi's absence.52 Furthermore,
not all of the sidebar discussions referred to the jurors' ability to
remain impartial.53 As the New York Court of Appeals held in
People v. Velasco,54 this type of questioning does not give rise to a
constitutional right of the defendant to be present.55
Therefore, it is submitted that careful examination of the jury
selection process in Antommarchi reveals that the defendant's ab-
sence from the sidebar conferences had no impact whatsoever on
his opportunity to defend against the drug charge. Accordingly,
be served in having the defendant present in court for resentence in those instances
where the court credits defendants averment that he was not advised of his right to
appeal."), affd, 331 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1972).
43 See Dioguardi, 428 F.2d at 1039 (15 to 20 feet is sufficiently present).
44Id.
45 Id.
46 See Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
47 See Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 3-7 (describing voir dire process).
48 See Bauder, supra note 8, at B2.
49 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4.
50 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4; Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 3-7.
Thirty-seven panelists requested to speak at the bench, rather than in open court. See
Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4. Their concerns about serving ranged from "business
commitments, doctor's appointments and sabbath observations" to "their own con-
flicts with the law or the arrests of family members or friends." Id.
51 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4; Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 3-7.
52 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4; Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 3-7.
53 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4; Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 3-7.
Some of the questioning related to prior obligations of the jurors. See Fisher, supra
note 14, at 1, 4; see also supra note 50 (discussing concerns of jurors).
54 570 N.E.2d 1070 (N.Y. 1991).
55 See supra notes 38 and accompanying text (stating Velasco's holding).
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the Snyder standard for mandating the defendant's presence re-
mained unsatisfied. Because there was no substantial relation be-
tween the defendant's absence and his ability to defend, it is as-
serted that the conferences that took place in Antommarchi were
not stages of trial at which he had a constitutionally protected
right to be present.5 6
II. Dm THE AArOMMARCHI COURT MISmTERPRET THE STATUTE?
Section 260.20 of the CPL provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a] defendant must be personally present during the trial of an
indictment . . . ."11 The Antommarchi court held that section
260.20 bestows upon a criminal defendant the right to be present
at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors when the inquiry
relates to impartiality.58 It is evident from the language and leg-
islative purpose of the statute, however, that section 260.20 is not
intended to address such stages of trial.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that courts
cannot give a statute an interpretation which the legislature could
have, but did not, clearly articulate. 59 If the New York Legisla-
ture had intended that section 260.20 guarantee defendants the
right to be present at sidebars, it would have expressly provided
so in the statute. 60 In fact, since it had become standard proce-
dure in New York to conduct sidebar conferences without the de-
fendant,61 it would have been necessary for the legislature to ex-
plicitly indicate that it was supplanting the existing judicial
56 See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08; Fritsch, Ruling in Minor Trial, supra note 9, at
Al, B5 ("I don't think there is a real injury to the interests of the defendant .... "
(quoting H. Richard Uviller, Columbia University Law School professor)). Further,
because there is no constitutional right to be present at sidebars, a defendant's in-
formed and knowing consent is not needed in order to waive it. See Taylor v. Illinois,
484 U.S. 400, 402 (1988) (holding that witness may be excluded from testifying with-
out violating Constitution when lawyer commits wilful misconduct).
57 N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993).
58 Antommarchi, 604 N.E.2d at 97.
59 See 1 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York: Statutes § 94 (1971)
("Words will not be expanded so as to enlarge their meaning to something which the
Legislature could easily have expressed but did not, and a court will not strain the
clear language of a statute to produce an unintended and inequitable result." (cita-
tions omitted)); see also id. § 230 ("It is fundamental that the words used should be
given the meaning intended by the lawmakers.. . ." (citation omitted)).
60 See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71-72 n.6 (1982) ("Had
Congress intended so fundamental a distinction, it would have expressed that intent
clearly in the statutory language or the legislative history.").
61 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that sidebar conferences in
defendant's absence are customary).
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interpretation of the statute in order to effectuate such a change
in the law.62 Furthermore, even if the legislature had intended to
change the customary practice in New York by enacting section
260.20, it gave absolutely no guidance to courts on the issue of
defendants' presence at sidebars.6 s
In addition, the legislative purpose behind section 260.20 sup-
ports the argument that it was misinterpreted by the Antom-
marchi court. The statute's purposes are to abolish the "ancient
evil of secret trials and to guarantee the defendant's right to be
[physically] present at all important stages of his trial."64 The
right to be present, however, "must be kept within the limits of
common sense and reason."65 It is submitted that this purpose
illustrates that the statute was intended only to extend to parts of
a trial which affect the defendant's opportunity to defend the
charge. Therefore, sidebars are necessarily excluded.66
The function of the judiciary is not to make law, but to inter-
pret and enforce it. 6 7 Judicial intent cannot replace legislative in-
tent.68 Thus, regardless of whether it agreed with the result,6 9 the
62 See American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 71-72 n.6.
63 See N.Y. Cmiu. Paoc. LAw § 260.20 (McKinney 1993) (indicating that § 260.20
makes no mention of sidebars).
64 People ex rel Lupo v. Fay, 196 N.E.2d 56, 58 (N.Y. 1963) (emphasis added),
(citation omitted) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 958 (1964); cf People v. Huggler, 378
N.Y.S.2d 493 (App. Div. 1976) (stating that section is designed for defendant's protec-
tion, and therefore may be waived).
65 See Lupo, 196 N.E.2d at 58 (citation omited).
66 See id.
67 See 1 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York: Statutes § 73 (1971).
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the courts should avoid
judicial legislation, since the Constitution of this state vests the legislative
power in the Senate and Assembly; and courts may not legislate under the
guise of interpretation of statutes. That the courts may not divest or usurp
the legislative power has been announced so frequently and in such varying
language as to defy complete repetition. Thus it is said that courts may not
make, change, amend, or repeal a statute.
As otherwise expressed, the judicial function is to interpret, declare, and
enforce the law, not to make it, and it is not for the courts to correct sup-
posed errors, omissions or defects in legislation.
Id. § 73, at 145-48 (citations omitted).
68 See id. § 73, at 148 ("A statute must be read and given effect as it is written by
the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the
Legislature had envisaged all of the problems and complications which might arise in
the course of its administration.. . ." (citations omitted)).
69 See id. § 92, at 180-81 ("Indeed the Legislature's intent must be ascertained
and effectuated whatever may be the opinion of the judiciary as to the wisdom, expe-
diency, or policy of the statute ... ." (citation omitted)).
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Antommarchi court was bound to effectuate the statute in the way
the legislature intended.
III. "RIGHT TO BE PRESENT": WRONG FOR OUR FUTURE
Ironically, Antommarchi rights may work to a defendant's
detriment. 70 According to one member of the judiciary, most ju-
rors already feel uncomfortable about revealing prejudices and
sensitive information to judges and lawyers.71 It is likely, there-
fore, that many jurors will become even more reluctant to answer
questions honestly when a criminal defendant is present, or even
to approach the bench when asked.72 In the aggregate, this proce-
dure leads to less disclosure of prejudice, resulting in more biased
juries.7 3 Consequently, most defense attorneys now advise their
clients to waive their right to be present at sidebars,7 4 so that the
70 See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (noting that defendants may not
want "Antommarchi rights").
71 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4; see also Steven B. Rosenfeld, Misperceived
Issue From "Antommarchi", 208 N.Y. L.J. 109 (1992) (stating jurors' responses in open
court may be inhibited).
72 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4 (discussing jurors' desire to respond at
bench).
73 See Fisher, supra note 14.
74 Telephone Interview with David Mudd, Assistant District Attorney, New York
County District Attorney's Office (Feb. 23, 1993). Criminal Court Judge Steven W.
Fisher accurately predicted the waiving of these rights would occur more frequently
when he stated:
[Ilt may come to pass that, after an appropriate period of study, the defense
bar will conclude that a defendant's exercise of the right to be present exacts
too high a toll in disrupting the flow of relevant and useful information
about prospective jurors. We may then see increasing numbers of defend-
ants, acting on the advice of counsel, waiving their "Antommarchi rights"
and allowing jurors to speak on sensitive matters in their absence.
I think it is reasonable to believe that many counseled defendants chose
not to object to their exclusion from these private discussions in the past
because they realized that their presence would be contrary to their own best
interests in learning about prospective jurors .... It therefore seems ironic
that these defendants now stand to win reversal of otherwise valid convic-
tions on the ground that they were deprived of a right which they chose, or
would have chosen, gladly to forego.
Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4.
The practice of advising such a waiver began after the New York Court of Appeals
handed down their decision in People v. Sloan, 592 N.E.2d 784, 785 (N.Y. 1992) (hold-
ing that conference related to jurors' knowledge of "pretrial publicity" went to merits
of case, and therefore, defendant must be present); see Gary Spencer, Defendant's
Rights at Trial at Issue; 3 Cases to be Argued Involve Presence of Accused at Sidebar
Conferences, 208 N.Y. L.J. 95 (1992).
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attorneys may learn as much as possible about each prospective
7.5juror.
Furthermore, it is submitted that Antommarchi rights will re-
sult in a multitude of baseless appeals and unfortunate reversals.
Since it is in a defendant's best interests to waive Antommarchi
rights, 76 the majority of defendants who do not waive them will be
those who were unaware such rights existed.7 7 Thus, if Antom-
marchi rights are preserved, the criminal justice system will be
faced with the anomalous result of defendants exercising rights of
which they were previously ignorant to subsequently secure
reversals.7
Moreover, it is suggested that Antommarchi rights merely en-
able defendants to search for subtle signs of lack of sympathy,
rather than to evaluate juror objectivity.79 Further, obtaining voir
dire transcripts will be time consuming, 0 thereby causing delays
the courts cannot afford.
Accordingly, it is submitted that a criminal defendant should
only have the right to attend sidebar conferences during jury im-
paneling when a balancing of the relevant factors manifests fulfill-
ment of the Snyder standard. It is further suggested that a de-
fendant should have the right to appeal only when his or her
request to be present was denied and a timely objection was made.
CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant's right to be present during all material
stages of trial is a fundamental tenet of criminal procedure law.
This Comment has suggested that the Antommarchi court, by
holding that this right encompasses presence at sidebar confer-
ences with prospective jurors, improperly extended the rights of
criminal defendants without any legislative authority or judicial
precedent. In holding that section 260.20 of the CPL deems
sidebar conferences with prospective jurors material stages of
75 Telephone Interview with David Mudd, Assistant District Attorney, New York
County District Attorney's Office (Feb. 23, 1993).
76 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of
right of presence).
77 See Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4.
78 Fisher, supra note 14, at 1, 4.
79 Making Law in the New York Courts, WASH. TInEs, Nov. 17, 1992, at F2.
80 See Spencer, supra note 74, at 1, 4 ("The problem is that it will take a very long
time to get the voir dire transcripts... ." (quoting E. Joshua Rosenkranz, attorney in
charge of the Office of the Appellate Defender)).
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trial, the Antommarchi court misconstrued the language of the
statute in a way that undermined its legislative purpose. In a so-
ciety wrought with crime and overcrowded courts, it is astonishing
that the New York Court of Appeals would, without precedent,
grant useless rights to defendants, which only exacerbate the
problems of the criminal justice system.
Christina Boulougouris
